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 Intra-Union Flexibility of Non-ETS Emission Reduction 
Obligations in the European Union 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The European Union has proposed greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for the 
year 2020 (CEC 2008b). There are a total of 28 targets: one Europe-wide target for 
emissions covered by the European Trading System (ETS) for carbon dioxide 
emission permits, and 27 targets (one per Member State) for the remaining 
greenhouse gases.1 The initially proposed targets were chosen such that the aggregate 
emission reduction target would be met in a cost-effective manner.2 That is, 
abatement costs are equal at the margin, between ETS and non-ETS and between 
Member States. However, this equalization is done ex ante. Without a trading 
mechanism, it may be that ex post marginal costs differ from one another, if the model 
or the scenario deviate from reality. Moreover, targets were later adjusted for political 
reasons. It would therefore be advisable to introduce some form of fungibility 
between ETS and non-ETS targets even if, given the approximately cost-effective 
initial allocation of targets, one would not expect that such fungibility would be much 
used. 
 
Three Member States tabled proposals for flexibility in meeting the non-ETS targets. 
The Irish government is particularly concerned about the costs of meeting its non-ETS 
target. It therefore proposed that a government of any Member State would be 
allowed to purchase ETS permits to offset its excess non-ETS emissions – that is, 
there is one-directional fungibility from ETS to non-ETS. The Polish government has 
the opposite concern. It argues that the costs outside the ETS are likely to be lower 
than inside, and it proposed that Member States be allowed to sell non-ETS emission 
allowances in the ETS. The Swedish government proposed that ETS and non-ETS be 
kept separate, but that non-ETS emission allocations be tradable between Member 
                                                 
1 There are also energy targets, but these are disregarded in this note. 
2 Note that the European Union only mentions the words “fair and equitable” (CEC 2008b). I assume 
that they first minimized the total costs and then allocated the effort equitably. This follows the 
principle that one first maximizes the size of the pie before distributing its pieces (Coase 1960). If this 
principle is not followed, it is possible to reduce everyone’s abatement costs and it cannot possibly be 
fair to impose unnecessary costs (Roemer 1996). 
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States. Together, these three proposals constitute a single market for all emissions in 
the European Union. Separately, the three alternative proposals move towards a single 
market, but do not reach it. Still, each of the three proposals cannot lower welfare, and 
probably increase. In this paper, I evaluate the three proposals, and their impact on 
(the distribution of) emission reduction costs. 
 
Although besides the topic of the paper, the calibration of the simple model used here 
to the results of the impact assessment of the European Commission reveals a number 
of results that are interesting in their own right – and which cast further doubt either 
on the technical competence of the European Commission or on the wisdom of 
making important decisions in haste and without scrutiny (Tol 2007). 
 
Much has been written about the potential of trade in emission permits to reduce the 
costs of abatement (Manne & Richels 1996;Montgomery 1972;Pizer 2002;Weyant, de 
la Chesnaye, & Blanford 2006), including in the European Union (Boehringer, 
Hoffmann, & Manrique-de-Lara-Penate 2006;Klepper & Peterson 2006). I do 
therefore not set out the general case for (or against) emission permit trade. Nor do I 
review the past performance of the EU ETS (Convery & Redmond 2007;Ellerman & 
Buchner 2007;Kruger, Oates, & Pizer 2007). I also do not discuss other inefficiencies 
in EU climate policy, particularly the overlapping regulation in emissions and energy 
(Boehringer, Koschel, & Moslener 2008). This paper is focused on the current 
proposals to enhance the flexibility of meeting the EU’s non-ETS emission targets. 
Section 2 sets out a simple model, based on (Rehdanz, Tol, & Wetzel 2006;Tol & 
Rehdanz 2008). Section 3 discusses the calibration of the model and its application. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
2.1. Model structure and properties 
 
Let us consider a market for tradable emission reduction permits with I countries. 
Emission reduction costs C are quadratic. Each country solves the problem: 
(1a)  2
,
min  s.t. 
i i
i i i i i i i i iR P
C R Y P R E P Eα π= + + ≥ − iA
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 R is proportional emission reduction; Y is gross domestic product; P denotes the 
amount of emission permits bought or sold; π is the emission permit price; assuming a 
perfect market, all companies face the same price; E are the emissions; A are the 
allocated emission permits; that is, if a country emits more than has been allocated, 
E>A, it will have to reduce emissions or buy permits on the market; α is a parameter; 
countries are indexed by i. If a country’s allocation exceeds its emissions, E<A, the 
optimization problem is: 
(1b) 3 2
,
min  s.t. 
j j
j j j j j j j j jR P
C R Y R E P P E Aα π π= − + ≥ − j
We assume that the country sells its hot air P=E-A, and in addition reduces emissions 
by RE which it sells at the market for πRE. Fixing A, we in fact assume that countries 
with hot air do not have market power. Countries with hot air are indexed by j. 
Countries without emission reduction targets are excluded from the market. 
The first order conditions of (1) are: 
(2a) 
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where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier. This is a system with 3(I+J) equations and 
3(I+J)+1 unknowns, but we also have that aggregate supply must equal aggregate 
demand, that is 
(2d)  
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which allows us to solve for the permit price π as well. (2) solves as: 
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3 Note that ( )2 2j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j jC R Y R E P R Y P R E R Y2 Pα π π α π α π ′= − + = + − = +  for :j j jP P R E′ = − j  
so that (1b) can be written as 2
,
min ' s.t. '
j j
j j j j j j j j j jR P
C R Y P R E P E Aα π= + + ≥ − which is the same as (1a) 
except that the first Ej-Aj permits are available without emission reduction costs. 
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(3b) ;
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So, the permit price goes up if the emission reduction obligation increases or if the 
costs of emission reduction increase. All companies face the same marginal costs of 
emission reduction, and the trade-off between reducing emissions in-house and 
buying or selling permits is driven by the ratio of marginal emission reduction costs 
and the permit price. The modelled market behaves as expected. Note that the solution 
without the market in emission permits (Pi=0) is trivial. 
If country I+1 joins the market, the price becomes 
(4) 
1 1
1 1
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A priori, one cannot say whether π* is larger or smaller than π. The new price π* 
would tend be larger than π if country I+1 has a large emission reduction obligation 
(E-A), and π* would tend be smaller than π if country I+1 has low emission reduction 
costs (α). Note that, if I is large, the difference between π* and π would tend to be 
small. 
 
Under the Irish proposal outlined in the introduction, the “country” joining the permit 
market is in fact the non-ETS part of a Member State. Non-ETS emissions would only 
enter the market if the marginal abatement costs exceed the permit price. Therefore, 
π*>π. In the Polish proposal, Member States would purchase ETS permits if these are 
cheaper than the carbon tax required to meet the non-ETS target. Therefore, π*<π. 
Under the Swedish proposal, there would be two markets, and there would be two 
prices πETS≠πnon-ETS. 
 
The questions are, how much would the Irish and Polish proposals affect the ETS 
price? And how much would the ETS and non-ETS price differ in the Polish 
proposal? As noted in the introduction, the initial allocation of targets is ex ante 
approximately cost-effective if the PRIMES model and scenario are correct. One 
would therefore expect prices to deviate by a small amount only. A large deviation 
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 would indicate that there major flaws in the models and scenarios used by the 
European Commission, which is hard to imagine as the European Commission is 
advised by the best energy and environmental economists in Europe.4 
 
2.2. Model calibration 
 
The model is calibrated in four steps. The 2020 emission reduction targets are relative 
to 2005 emissions. We use two sets of data for total greenhouse gas emissions in 
2005: the official country statistics as reported to the UNFCCC, and the emissions 
reported in impact assessment of the European Commission (Capros et al. 2008). See 
Table A1. There are substantial, unexplained differences between the data. The 
UNFCCC data allow for a reasonable approximation of the ETS share in the 2005 
emissions.5 See Table A2. The sector detail is much less for the CEC data, and 
therefore I use an upper and lower bound of the ETS share, by putting all industry 
emissions and all non-energy CO2 emissions inside or outside the ETS. I refer to 
these calibrations as EUmax and EUmin. The CEC study reports total emissions in 
2005 and 2020 as well as growth rates for ETS and non-ETS emissions. Together, this 
implies ETS and non-ETS emissions in 2005 and 2020.6 This results in negative 
emissions for Denmark and Luxembourg, so I replaced the ETS share for these 
countries with average of the upper and lower bound. I refer to this calibration as 
EUmid.7 Note that EUmid does not necessarily lies in between EUmax and EUmin 
(see Table A2), which suggests that there are further problems with the data of Capros 
et al. (2008). 
 
For 2020, I use four alternative projections, viz. (1) the UNFCCC data for 2005 with 
the ETS and non-ETS growth rates of (Capros, Mantzos, Papandreou, & Tasios 
                                                 
4 See http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.ene.html#authors and 
http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.env.html#authors. 
5 Note that the ETS / non-ETS split is an approximation because the UNFCCC statistics follow the 
sectoral classification of the International Energy Agency, while the ETS is based on installations. For 
instance, the power plant of a large university would be classified as “institutional” in the UNFCCC – 
and would thus be placed outside the ETS even though it is in reality covered. 
6 We know that E2005 + N2005 = M2005, where E2005 are ETS emissions in 2005, N are non-ETS emissions 
and M are total emissions. We also know that E2020 + N2020 = E2005(1+gE)15 + N2005(1+gM)15 = M2020 
where gE is the annual growth rate of ETS emissions, and gM of non-ETS emissions. Capros et al. 
(2008) report M2005, M2020, gE and gM, so that we have two equations and two unknowns (E2005, N2005). 
7 The UNFCCC values for Cyprus and Malta are set equal to their EUmid values. 
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2008); (2) the EU data for 2005 and 2020 with lower bound ETS;  (3) the EU data 
with upper bound ETS; and (4) the EU data as calibrated above. See Table A1 for the 
total emissions, and Table A2 for the ETS share. 
 
For each of the four baselines, I calibrate the unit cost parameters αi for emission 
reduction in the ETS by assuming that these are proportional to the square root of the 
relative carbon efficiency of the economy (Rehdanz, Tol, & Wetzel 2006), as follows: 
(5) 1.57 0.17 mini ii i
i i
E E
Y Y
α ∝ − −  
Furthermore, I assume that π=€40/tCO2 in 2020 (Capros, Mantzos, Papandreou, & 
Tasios 2008). See Table A3. 
 
The unit cost parameters αi for non-ETS emissions are set such that the cost-effective 
non-ETS emission reduction targets of (Capros, Mantzos, Papandreou, & Tasios 
2008) are cost-effective in this model as well. See Table A4. For EUmid, there is a 
variant: I calibrate the unit cost parameters such that the marginal cost is as reported 
in the impact assessment of the European Commission (CEC 2008a).8 I refer to this 
scenario as EUprice. 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Results for the base case 
 
Table 1 shows the marginal emission costs (or the carbon tax, or the domestic price 
for tradable permits) for the 27 Member States in 2020 for the four alternative 
calibrations of the split between ETS and non-ETS emissions, and the price variant on 
EUmid. Note that the EUmid and UNFCCC calibrations yield identical result because 
the unit cost calibration procedure exactly offsets the differences in 2005 year data. 
The marginal costs differ substantially from the assumed ETS price of €40/tCO2. That 
is, the political adjustments of the cost-effective targets were substantial. 
 
                                                 
8 Note that there are four countries with hot air. I keep the unit cost parameters as in the EUmid 
scenario. For Portugal, I reduced the baseline non-ETS emissions to the target. 
 7
 Table 1 also reveals that the non-ETS allocation of Bulgaria and Czech Republic is 
larger than their projected emissions in all five calibrations. For Poland, this holds for 
four calibrations, while Portugal has hot air in one calibration. These entries are 
marked as “hot air” in Table 1.9 
 
Table 1 identifies the nine countries that would purchase ETS permits to offset non-
ETS emissions in the Irish proposal. Eighteen countries would sell non-ETS 
emissions to the ETS in the Polish proposal. The trade pattern is stable across the 
baseline calibrations, but in the EUprice variant on EUmid, a few countries change 
position. 
 
Table 2 shows the carbon prices in the ETS according to the five calibration and the 
five policy cases. Without fungibility between ETS and non-ETS emissions, the ETS 
price would be €40/tCO2, and the carbon price outside the ETS would be as in Table 
1. With the Irish proposal, the ETS price would increase by up to €4/tCO2. This price 
would apply to ETS emissions in all Member States and to non-ETS emissions in 
those Member States marked with a single asterisk* in Table 1. The price increases 
because selected Member States purchase ETS permits to offset excess non-ETS 
emissions by the amount given in Table 3. With the Polish proposal, the ETS price 
would fall by €7 to €11/tCO2eq. This price would apply to ETS emissions in all 
Member States and to non-ETS emissions in those Member States marked with a 
double asterisk** in Table 1. The price goes down because selected Member States 
sell excess non-ETS emissions by the amount given in Table 3. With the Swedish 
proposal, the ETS price would be unchanged. The non-ETS price would be between 
€27 and €31/tCO2eq for all Member States. With full emissions trading (the Irish plus 
Polish plus Swedish proposal), the permit price would be between €34 and 
€36/tCO2eq. This price would apply to all emissions in all Member States. Table 3 
shows that there is indeed a net sale of emission permits into the ETS. 
 
Table 3 also shows that in all cases and under all proposals, the flow of permits to or 
from the ETS is modest. Under the Irish proposal, less than 3% of ETS permits would 
                                                 
9 The calibration procedure described above implies α<0 for these countries; α was reset to the EU 
average. 
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be used to offset non-ETS emissions. Under the Polish proposal, ETS emissions 
would grow by less than 7%. 
 
Under the Swedish proposal, ETS emissions are unchanged. This does imply, 
however, that the non-ETS market has 27 buyers and sellers only. This may imply 
market power. Table A5 shows the trading pattern. With 14 sellers and 13 buyers, an 
equal market share would be 7 to 8%. Two sellers stand out (Poland, Romania) and 
two buyers (Italy, Spain). These countries may be able to exert a degree of monopoly 
or monopsony power. That is, Poland and Romania may withhold some of their 
emissions from the market in order to drive up the price, while Italy and Spain may 
suppress their demand in order to reduce the price. The results presented in this paper 
do not consider this. The ability to exert market power depends on the structure of the 
market, no proposals for which have yet been made. However, a continuous double 
auction may be the most appropriate choice in situations like this (Carlen 2003). 
 
Table 4 shows the total costs of emission reduction, here presented as a percent of 
GDP in 2020. Each of the four proposals improves welfare in each calibration, as they 
should. In each calibration, the Irish proposal has the smallest effect, followed by the 
Polish proposal, the Swedish proposal, and (as expected) full trade. Table 5 shows the 
total costs for the five alternative policies per Member State for the EUmid 
calibration. Costs vary widely, with Latvia the biggest loser and Bulgaria the biggest 
winner as it expects to export a lot of permits. Table 5 also shows which Member 
State would support / oppose which policy the most. The Member States are 
unanimous that the unreformed ETS is suboptimal, but different Member States prefer 
different alternatives.10 
 
3.2. Sensitivity analysis 
 
Showing results for five alternative calibrations, some of the sensitivities of the results 
to the assumptions are explored above. However, the five alternative calibrations have 
different baseline emissions as well as different reduction costs, and these two 
differences are calibrated to offset one another. This explains why the EUprice 
                                                 
10 Interestingly, the Irish, Poles and Swedes do not prefer the proposals named after them. 
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 calibration stands out. I therefore show five additional sets of results, based on the 
EUmid calibration. 
 
First, I increase the non-ETS emissions for 2020 for Ireland based on a recent 
projection for that country (Fitz Gerald et al. 2008). Second, I increase the non-ETS 
emissions for 2020 for all Member States, applying the same ratio for the growth rate 
as for Ireland. Specifically, the growth in non-ETS emissions between 2005 and 2020 
is multiplied by a factor 1.14. Third, I increase the unit cost of non-ETS emission 
reduction in Ireland so as to match a recent projection for that country (Cambridge 
Econometrics 2008). Fourth, I increase the unit cost of non-ETS emission reduction in 
all Member States by the same factor (3.1). Fifth, I increase emissions as in the 
second scenario and reduction costs as in the fourth scenario. 
 
Table 6 shows the effect of the price of emission permits in 2020, Table 7 the impact 
on total costs, and Table 8 the net demand on ETS emissions. As I either increased the 
emission reduction obligation, or the costs of abatement, or both, it is no surprise that 
both the marginal and total cost of emission reduction go up. As the perturbations of 
emissions and costs are in the non-ETS sectors, the ETS is not affected if there is no 
fungibility between ETS and non-ETS. As emission reduction outside the ETS 
becomes more expensive, the Polish proposal loses much of its appeal – most of the 
hot air in the EUmid scenario disappears, with only a small amount left in Bulgaria. 
Table 7 shows that the costs escalate in the Polish proposal almost as much as in case 
of the current ETS. Costs also escalate in the Swedish proposal, but less. 
 
The Irish proposal, on the other hand, behaves much like full trade. Indeed, in the full 
trade case, there would be less reason to sell non-ETS emission to the ETS (as in the 
Polish proposal) and less reason to trade non-ETS emissions between Member States 
(as in the Swedish proposal). Instead, the market would seek to buy more ETS 
emission permits to offset non-ETS emissions (as in the Irish proposal). Table 8 
highlights this. 
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Figure 1 shows the impact on the total costs of emission reduction if unit emission 
reduction costs are either higher of lower than in the base case.11 The case with higher 
unit emission reduction costs is described above. The case with lower unit emission 
reduction costs uses the inverse ratio – that is, the unit costs of the base case are 
multiplied with the ratio of base case costs to high case costs. In Figure 1, the costs 
for each of the five policy scenarios are normalized to unity for the unit costs 
calibrated to PRIMES. If unit costs are higher, total costs go up in all policy scenarios. 
Costs increase most under the Polish proposal, and least under the Irish proposal – as 
discussed above. If unit costs are lower, total costs go down in all policy scenarios. 
Costs decrease most under the Polish proposal, and almost as much under full trade. 
The current ETS is in the middle, and very close to costs under the Irish proposal. The 
costs decrease least under the Swedish proposal. The Polish proposal best exploits 
positive surprises in the non-ETS sectors, while the Irish proposal is most robust 
against negative surprises. However, scale is important too – the absolute loss of a 
negative surprise is 1.03% (0.36%) of GDP under the Polish (Irish) proposal, but the 
absolute gain of the positive surprise is 0.54% (0.28%) of GDP under the Polish 
(Irish) proposal. If both types of surprises were equally likely, a risk averse decision 
maker would prefer the Irish proposal. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
 
In this paper, I discuss the implications of intra-EU flexibility in meeting the non-ETS 
emission reduction targets, using a simple model calibrated to the impact assessment 
of the European Commission DG Environment (Capros, Mantzos, Papandreou, & 
Tasios 2008). The following results emerge. 
 
Firstly, the non-ETS emission allocation is advertised by the European Commission 
as approximately cost-effective, but the analysis here shows substantial deviation 
from a uniform carbon price between ETS and non-ETS, and between non-ETS 
emissions in different Member States. 
 
                                                 
11 The case with lower non-ETS emissions than in EUmid has a substantial amount of hot air, and is 
not considered further. 
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 Secondly, it appears that at least two countries have received non-ETS allocations that 
exceed their emissions as projected by CEC DG Environment (Capros, Mantzos, 
Papandreou, & Tasios 2008). 
 
Thirdly, the Irish proposal to allow Member States to purchase ETS permits to offset 
excess non-ETS emissions would increase the price of emission permits by less than 
10%. The Polish proposal to allow Member States to sell non-ETS emissions into the 
ETS would decrease the price of emission permits by more than 15%. The Swedish 
proposal to allow Member States to sell non-ETS emission allocations to one another 
would have non-ETS emission permits trading at a price that is 25% or more lower 
than the ETS price. The first-best solution, a single market for all emissions, would 
settle on a price that is at least 10% below the projected ETS price of €40/tCO2eq. 
From a welfare perspective, the single ETS plus non-ETS market performs best. The 
Polish and Swedish proposals perform roughly the same, and better than the Irish 
proposal, which in turn outperforms current policy. However, from the perspective of 
maintaining a strong carbon price signal in the ETS sector, the Irish proposal is the 
preferred option. 
 
Fourthly, the Irish proposal emerges as the preferred alternative (after, of course, a 
complete market) if either non-ETS emissions or reduction costs were higher than 
anticipated. This follows directly from the structure of the proposal. The Polish 
proposal would fare better if non-ETS emissions or reduction costs were lower, or if 
ETS emissions and reductions were higher. The choice between the Irish and Polish 
proposal in the face of such uncertainty is therefore a judgement call. However, ETS 
emissions are characterized by large point sources and slow capital turnover. Non-
ETS emissions are more diffuse and more dynamic. One can therefore argue that non-
ETS emissions and reduction costs are more uncertain. Such uncertainty is underlined 
by the fact that the impact assessment of the European Commission does not 
reproduce the historical record. The Irish proposal is more robust to such uncertainty, 
while the Polish proposal is not. 
 
The results presented here come with all the usual caveats. The numbers depend on a 
range of assumptions, each of which is uncertain and disputable. It would therefore be 
recommendable to reproduce the analysis here with other models. More complicated 
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models may find that the model used here is oversimplified. However, the qualitative 
results are probably robust as they follow intuitively from the structure of the problem 
and the alternative policies. There are also things that were not considered in this 
paper. Chief among these are potential market power under the Swedish proposal, and 
the ability to purchase emission permits outside the European Union (through the 
Clean Development Mechanism or its successor), including the proposed limitations 
imposed on that as well as the option to trade CDM allocations. These issues are 
deferred to future research. 
 
In sum, the European Union has created a potential economic problem by imposing 
28 emission reduction targets of varying strictness. If for political reasons it is not 
feasible to replace the 28 targets with a single one, then the Irish proposal to allow 
Member States to purchase ETS emission permits to offset excess non-ETS emissions 
emerges as a policy that would maintain, or even strengthen the integrity of the ETS 
while at the same time controlling the costs on non-ETS emission reduction. 
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Table 1. Marginal emission reduction costs (in €/tCO2eq) in 2020 in the 25 
Member States according to three alternative calibrations of the ETS/non-ETS 
split of emissions. 
 
 
 EUmin EUmid EUmax EUprice UNFCCC 
ETS 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 
Non-ETS  
Austria* 42.51 42.67 42.49 62.00 42.67 
Belgium** 35.73 35.96 36.32 42.00 35.96 
Bulgaria** Hot air Hot air Hot air Hot air Hot air 
Cyprus** 26.31 23.62 25.60 31.00 23.62 
Czechia** Hot air Hot air Hot air Hot air Hot air 
Denmark* 68.99 77.78 67.56 81.00 77.78 
Estonia** 14.29 4.17 3.32 4.00 4.17 
Finland** 38.42 38.38 38.87 20.00 38.38 
France** 37.59 37.40 37.59 37.00 37.40 
Germany* 40.37 40.43 40.31 25.00** 40.43 
Greece** 19.43 19.47 20.50 27.00 19.47 
Hungary** 5.29 4.52 5.34 5.00 4.52 
Ireland* 49.84 54.66 53.14 57.00 54.66 
Italy* 44.57 45.05 44.57 92.00 45.05 
Latvia** 22.61 20.24 19.64 71.00 20.24 
Lithuania** 5.55 4.43 2.82 3.00 4.43 
Luxembourg* 47.55 47.80 47.21 88.00 47.80 
Malta** 19.33 12.39 19.33 22.00 12.39 
The Netherlands* 45.72 47.02 46.05 47.00 47.02 
Poland** 5.55 Hot air Hot air Hot air Hot air 
Portugal** 11.68 3.59 7.11 Hot air 3.59 
Romania** 7.56 3.75 1.72 4.00 3.75 
Slovakia** 9.15 2.28 0.59 2.00 2.28 
Slovenia** 20.68 21.08 21.43 63.00* 21.08 
Spain** 35.47 34.79 35.28 72.00* 34.79 
Sweden* 43.96 46.04 46.70 87.00 46.04 
UK* 54.88 80.00 58.16 19.00** 80.00 
* Purchases ETS permits in the Irish proposal. 
** Sells ETS permits in the Polish proposal. 
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 Table 2. The price of carbon (in €/CO2eq) inside and outside the ETS for five 
alternative policies and five alternative calibrations. 
 
 
Panel A. ETS 
 EUmin EUmid EUmax EUprice UNFCCC
ETS 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00
Irish 42.33 41.21 41.42 44.41 41.70
Polish 29.15 30.53 33.21 29.69 30.63
Swedish 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00
Full trade 34.22 34.83 36.05 36.42 35.60
 
 
Panel B. Non-ETS 
 EUmin EUmid EUmax EUprice UNFCCC 
ETS Table 1 Table 1 Table 1 Table 1 Table 1 
Irish Table 1** Table 1** Table 1** Table 1** Table 1** 
Polish Table 1* Table 1* Table 1* Table 1* Table 1* 
Swedish 30.82 27.40 30.68 30.67 30.16 
Full trade 34.22 34.83 36.05 36.42 35.60 
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Table 3. The net change in total available emission permits (in million metric tones of 
carbon dioxide) in the ETS for five alternative policies and five alternative 
calibrations; for comparison, the initial amount of ETS permits is given too, as well as 
the net change in percent of the initial amount. 
 
 EUmin EUmid EUmax Euprice UNFCCC
ETS 0 0 0 0 0
Irish -24 -21 -24 -75 -20
Polish 110 162 137 177 112
Swedish 0 0 0 0 0
Full trade 59 89 66 61 53
Total permits 1,654 2,733 2,649 2,733 1,907
Irish (%) -1.43 -0.76 -0.90 -2.76 -1.07
Polish (%) 6.67 5.93 5.17 6.46 5.87
Full trade (%) 3.56 3.24 2.49 2.24 2.76
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 Table 4. The total cost of emission reduction (in %GDP) for five alternative policies 
and five alternative calibrations. 
 
 EUmin EUmid EUmax Euprice UNFCCC 
ETS 1.215 1.313 1.364 1.484 1.022 
Irish 1.204 1.298 1.353 1.386 1.004 
Polish 1.072 1.146 1.221 1.313 0.903 
Swedish 1.044 1.159 1.218 1.192 0.891 
Full trade 1.026 1.123 1.198 1.174 0.874 
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Table 5. The total cost of emission reduction (in %GDP) in each Member States for 
five alternative policies for the EUmid calibration; the right most columns denote the 
most and least preferred policy. 
 
 ETS Irish Polish Swedish Full trade Best Worst 
Austria -1.82 -1.84 -1.62 -1.74 -1.70 P I 
Belgium -1.98 -2.00 -1.79 -1.95 -1.90 P I 
Bulgaria 10.11 11.05 7.79 13.44 10.90 S P 
Cyprus -0.36 -0.36 -0.37 -0.35 -0.31 F P 
Czechia 1.12 1.25 1.53 2.14 2.16 F E 
Denmark -1.46 -1.26 -1.37 -1.06 -1.12 S E 
Estonia -0.52 -0.35 -0.67 0.13 -0.01 S P 
Finland -1.54 -1.56 -1.36 -1.52 -1.46 P I 
France -0.64 -0.64 -0.60 -0.60 -0.63 P I 
Germany -0.97 -0.95 -1.02 -0.95 -1.01 P S 
Greece -1.01 -1.01 -0.88 -0.96 -0.82 F E 
Hungary -1.77 -1.73 -1.34 -1.35 -1.13 F E 
Ireland -2.13 -2.11 -1.87 -1.93 -1.88 P E 
Italy -2.30 -2.32 -2.04 -2.19 -2.13 P I 
Latvia -5.08 -5.17 -4.11 -4.99 -4.29 P I 
Lithuania -2.04 -2.08 -0.77 -1.34 -0.62 F I 
Luxembourg -1.99 -1.97 -1.90 -1.70 -1.83 S E 
Malta 3.10 3.21 2.49 3.24 2.96 S P 
The Netherlands -2.38 -2.40 -2.07 -2.27 -2.18 P I 
Poland -1.61 -1.59 0.06 -0.26 0.52 F E 
Portugal -2.08 -2.11 -1.55 -1.87 -1.59 P I 
Romania -2.34 -2.22 -1.35 -1.14 -0.66 F E 
Slovakia -2.25 -2.19 -1.65 -1.60 -1.34 F E 
Slovenia -1.86 -1.87 -1.60 -1.81 -1.55 F I 
Spain -1.42 -1.43 -1.30 -1.38 -1.36 P I 
Sweden -1.82 -1.85 -1.56 -1.72 -1.64 P I 
UK -1.01 -0.96 -0.96 -0.92 -0.92 S E 
 19
 Table 6. The price of carbon (in €/CO2eq) in the ETS for the EUmid calibration and 
five variations that have higher non-ETS emissions in Ireland and the entire EU, 
higher costs in Ireland and the entire EU, or both higher non-ETS emissions and 
higher costs (entire EU only). 
 
 EUmid Higher emissions Higher costs Both 
  Ireland EU27 Ireland EU27 EU27 
ETS 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00
Irish 41.21 41.51 49.71 41.42 51.06 68.42
Polish 30.53 30.53 35.75 30.53 35.59 39.73
Swedish 27.40 27.98 56.04 27.63 83.86 171.53
Full trade 34.83 35.05 47.29 34.95 48.13 68.16
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Table 7. The total cost of emission reduction (in %GDP) for the EUmid calibration 
and five variations that have higher non-ETS emissions in Ireland and the entire EU, 
higher costs in Ireland and the entire EU, or both higher non-ETS emissions and 
higher costs (entire EU only). 
 
 EUmid Higher emissions Higher costs Both 
  Ireland EU27 Ireland EU27 EU27
ETS 1.313 1.342 2.694 1.343 2.219 6.446
Irish 1.298 1.317 2.352 1.303 1.653 3.380
Polish 1.146 1.192 2.651 1.193 2.173 6.445
Swedish 1.159 1.188 2.354 1.176 1.793 5.405
Full trade 1.123 1.159 2.289 1.146 1.579 3.377
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 Table 8. The net change in total available emission permits (in million metric tones of 
carbon dioxide) in the ETS for the EUmid calibration and five variations that have 
higher non-ETS emissions in Ireland and the entire EU, higher costs in Ireland and the 
entire EU, or both higher non-ETS emissions and higher costs (entire EU only). 
 
 EUmid Higher emissions Higher costs Both 
  Ireland EU27 Ireland EU27 EU27
ETS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Irish -21 -26 -166 -24 -189 -487
Polish 162 162 73 162 76 5
Swedish 0 0 0 0 0 0
Full trade 89 85 -125 87 -139 -482
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Figure 1. Indexed costs of emission reduction under five different policy proposals 
and three calibrations of the unit costs parameters; PRIMES corresponds to EUmid 
above. 
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 Table A1. Greenhouse gas emissions (million metric tonne of carbon dioxide 
equivalent) in 2005 and 2020, and the average annual growth rate. 
 
 EU UNFCCC 
 2005 2020 growth 2005 2020 Growth
Austria 97.9 104.2 0.42 79.3 83.6 0.35
Belgium 141.4 152.5 0.51 123.4 131.1 0.41
Bulgaria 65.2 68.4 0.32 54.0 56.1 0.26
Cyprus 8.6 8.5 -0.08 8.6 8.4 -0.16
Czechia 145.4 143.0 -0.11 125.3 123.5 -0.09
Denmark 66.0 64.5 -0.16 50.2 49.0 -0.16
Estonia 18.9 21.7 0.93 16.5 19.0 0.94
Finland 69.1 70.6 0.14 56.6 57.5 0.10
France 561.0 555.7 -0.06 417.2 407.9 -0.15
Germany 1003.3 999.4 -0.03 876.8 858.4 -0.14
Greece 131.8 136.6 0.24 110.3 112.8 0.14
Hungary 78.9 90.8 0.94 61.3 70.2 0.91
Ireland 75.8 80.7 0.42 47.6 50.9 0.44
Italy 575.7 644.6 0.76 490.3 543.4 0.69
Latvia 10.8 17.8 3.39 7.5 12.2 3.28
Lithuania 19.3 23.5 1.32 12.1 14.8 1.37
Luxembourg 13.9 15.1 0.55 14.2 15.4 0.55
Malta 3.5 2.8 -1.48 3.5 3.0 -1.01
Netherlands 220.8 241.5 0.60 175.8 190.9 0.55
Poland 373.6 423.1 0.83 316.8 358.2 0.82
Portugal 87.3 97.3 0.73 68.0 75.1 0.67
Romania 149.4 189.8 1.61 105.4 133.6 1.59
Slovakia 50.5 60.7 1.23 40.7 48.5 1.18
Slovenia 19.7 23.2 1.10 16.8 19.6 1.06
Spain 449.6 491.8 0.60 367.0 395.0 0.49
Sweden 70.0 82.6 1.11 52.3 60.9 1.02
UK 703.8 684.3 -0.19 558.2 527.0 -0.38
EU27 5211.2 5494.6 0.35 4255.6 4426.1 0.26
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Table A2. The share of ETS in total emissions (cf. Table A1) in four alternative 
calibrations. 
 
 EUmin  EUmid*  EUmax  UNFCCC 
 2005 2020 2005 2020 2005 2020 2005 2020 
Austria 0.20 0.22 0.49 0.51 0.47 0.48 0.33 0.35 
Belgium 0.18 0.22 0.55 0.57 0.41 0.42 0.34 0.36 
Bulgaria 0.43 0.43 0.67 0.70 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.63 
Cyprus 0.41 0.34 0.36 0.31 0.47 0.41 0.42 0.37 
Czechia 0.44 0.39 0.51 0.47 0.66 0.62 0.49 0.46 
Denmark 0.34 0.33 0.40 0.40 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.46 
Estonia 0.60 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.68 0.69 0.80 0.80 
Finland 0.33 0.39 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.58 0.52 0.55 
France 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.22 
Germany 0.35 0.37 0.73 0.75 0.53 0.54 0.43 0.44 
Greece 0.38 0.36 0.42 0.40 0.51 0.49 0.60 0.58 
Hungary 0.24 0.25 0.60 0.61 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.40 
Ireland 0.20 0.22 0.39 0.44 0.33 0.37 0.41 0.46 
Italy 0.27 0.28 0.51 0.53 0.47 0.48 0.38 0.40 
Latvia 0.20 0.20 0.43 0.47 0.31 0.37 0.32 0.35 
Lithuania 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.44 0.45 
Luxembourg 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.17 
Malta 0.54 0.32 0.52 0.33 0.54 0.32 0.42 0.25 
Netherlands 0.30 0.34 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.42 0.47 
Poland 0.46 0.44 0.36 0.36 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.60 
Portugal 0.31 0.34 0.50 0.54 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.49 
Romania 0.30 0.30 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.57 0.47 0.48 
Slovakia 0.31 0.30 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.46 0.48 
Slovenia 0.31 0.28 0.42 0.38 0.48 0.44 0.46 0.42 
Spain 0.28 0.25 0.19 0.18 0.50 0.48 0.43 0.42 
Sweden 0.11 0.11 0.35 0.41 0.38 0.45 0.30 0.35 
UK 0.32 0.33 0.70 0.72 0.46 0.47 0.40 0.43 
EU27 0.30 0.30 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.43 
* The EUprice scenario uses the same projections as EUmid. 
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 Table A3. Unit cost parameters in ETS according to five alternative calibrations; the 
EU27 is the weighted average, using baseline emissions as weights; the last two 
columns show the mean and standard deviation. 
 
 EUmin EUmid EUmax EUprice UNFCCC mean st.dev. 
Austria 13.8 19.8 19.6 19.8 15.3 17.6 2.9 
Belgium 13.8 19.6 19.6 19.6 15.2 17.5 2.9 
Bulgaria 13.0 18.4 18.3 18.4 14.3 16.5 2.6 
Cyprus 13.6 19.9 19.6 19.9 15.1 17.6 3.0 
Czechia 13.3 19.2 18.8 19.2 14.8 17.1 2.8 
Denmark 13.8 20.0 19.8 20.0 15.3 17.8 3.0 
Estonia 13.0 19.0 18.6 19.0 14.3 16.8 2.9 
Finland 13.6 19.7 19.5 19.7 15.1 17.5 2.9 
France 14.1 20.6 20.2 20.6 15.7 18.2 3.1 
Germany 13.6 19.5 19.5 19.5 15.2 17.5 2.8 
Greece 13.5 19.7 19.3 19.7 14.9 17.4 3.0 
Hungary 13.6 19.3 19.4 19.3 15.0 17.3 2.8 
Ireland 13.8 19.9 19.8 19.9 15.3 17.7 2.9 
Italy 13.7 19.7 19.5 19.7 15.2 17.6 2.9 
Latvia 13.7 19.5 19.4 19.5 15.1 17.4 2.8 
Lithuania 13.5 19.7 19.4 19.7 15.1 17.5 2.9 
Luxembourg 14.0 20.2 20.0 20.2 15.5 18.0 3.0 
Malta 13.6 19.9 19.7 19.9 15.2 17.7 3.0 
Netherlands 13.7 19.7 19.5 19.7 15.2 17.6 2.9 
Poland 13.2 19.4 18.8 19.4 14.6 17.1 2.9 
Portugal 13.6 19.5 19.3 19.5 15.0 17.4 2.9 
Romania 13.3 19.0 18.7 19.0 14.7 16.9 2.7 
Slovakia 13.4 19.1 18.8 19.1 14.8 17.1 2.7 
Slovenia 13.6 19.6 19.3 19.6 15.0 17.4 2.9 
Spain 13.7 20.2 19.5 20.2 15.2 17.8 3.1 
Sweden 14.1 20.1 19.9 20.1 15.5 17.9 2.9 
UK 13.7 19.7 19.7 19.7 15.3 17.6 2.9 
EU27 13.6 19.6 19.4 19.6 15.1 17.5 2.9 
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Table A4. Unit cost parameters in non-ETS according to five alternative calibrations; 
the EU27 is the weighted average, using baseline emissions as weights; the last two 
columns show the mean and standard deviation. 
 
 EUmin EUmid EUmax EUprice UNFCCC mean st.dev. 
Austria 26.6 17.6 17.4 25.6 18.6 21.2 4.5 
Belgium 30.4 16.0 20.1 18.6 20.5 21.1 5.5 
Bulgaria 81.0 65.6 70.8 65.6* 67.0 70.0 6.5 
Cyprus 23.4 28.2 21.7 37.0 25.5 27.2 6.0 
Czechia 58.0 51.0 33.4 51.0* 45.4 47.8 9.2 
Denmark 26.7 29.9 21.0 31.1 20.3 25.8 5.0 
Estonia 24.9 30.2 23.2 29.0 12.7 24.0 6.9 
Finland 36.2 24.5 18.6 12.8 21.9 22.8 8.7 
France 25.4 26.4 20.5 26.1 17.0 23.1 4.2 
Germany 38.9 17.7 24.5 10.9 33.2 25.0 11.3 
Greece 29.2 27.3 22.4 37.8 15.7 26.5 8.2 
Hungary 34.3 18.3 28.8 20.2 21.5 24.6 6.7 
Ireland 23.5 23.5 24.0 24.5 14.4 22.0 4.3 
Italy 26.9 19.1 19.4 39.0 20.6 25.0 8.4 
Latvia 17.3 12.4 14.9 43.4 10.3 19.7 13.5 
Lithuania 22.5 22.2 20.9 15.0 11.6 18.5 4.9 
Luxembourg 23.7 22.0 19.1 40.6 22.2 25.5 8.6 
Malta 21.4 26.8 21.4 47.5 32.1 29.8 10.8 
Netherlands 28.7 26.0 22.9 26.0 22.0 25.1 2.7 
Poland 37.5 48.7 32.5 48.7* 25.9 38.6 10.0 
Portugal 34.6 29.8 29.5 29.8* 25.6 29.8 3.2 
Romania 38.7 28.3 26.5 30.2 21.4 29.0 6.3 
Slovakia 38.3 27.4 25.8 24.1 26.4 28.4 5.7 
Slovenia 24.9 21.0 18.7 62.8 16.6 28.8 19.2 
Spain 21.7 26.7 15.7 55.3 15.2 26.9 16.6 
Sweden 12.8 11.7 11.9 22.1 9.5 13.6 4.9 
UK 38.7 41.3 36.8 9.8 64.9 38.3 19.6 
EU27 32.4 28.2 24.8 32.0 29.4 29.4 3.1 
* As in EUmid. 
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Table A5. Net demand (million metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent) according 
to five alternative calibrations under the Swedish proposal. Net sellers (buyers) with a 
market share above 14% are indicated in italics (bold). 
 
 Eumin EUmid EUmax EUprice UNFCCC mean share* 
Austria 4.4 3.4 2.9 4.8 3.0 3.7 3.5 
Belgium 2.8 2.8 2.7 3.2 2.4 2.8 2.6 
Bulgaria -11.8 -6.9 -8.4 -7.1 -7.2 -8.3 -7.9 
Cyprus -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
Czechia -13.7 -10.9 -8.1 -11.9 -10.5 -11.0 -10.5 
Denmark 4.9 4.5 4.1 4.3 2.9 4.1 3.9 
Estonia -1.2 -1.3 -1.2 -1.6 -0.6 -1.2 -1.1 
Finland 0.9 0.8 0.9 -1.6 0.6 0.3 0.3 
France 14.0 18.9 11.5 12.1 8.8 13.0 12.4 
Germany 16.6 8.2 14.3 -5.7 12.1 9.1 8.6 
Greece -5.3 -3.4 -3.9 -1.1 -2.7 -3.3 -3.1 
Hungary -11.7 -5.4 -9.8 -5.5 -7.2 -7.9 -7.5 
Ireland 5.6 4.1 4.2 3.8 2.3 4.0 3.8 
Italy 29.2 22.5 21.3 38.3 20.5 26.3 25.0 
Latvia -1.5 -0.8 -1.5 1.3 -0.9 -0.7 -0.7 
Lithuania -3.2 -2.8 -3.0 -4.9 -1.6 -3.1 -2.9 
Luxembourg 1.4 1.5 1.2 2.2 1.3 1.5 1.4 
Malta -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
Netherlands 9.3 7.8 6.9 6.5 5.7 7.2 6.9 
Poland -40.4 -45.4 -33.5 -50.7 -26.5 -39.3 -37.3 
Portugal -5.4 -3.8 -4.4 -4.8 -3.6 -4.4 -4.2 
Romania -28.9 -18.7 -19.9 -19.7 -15.8 -20.6 -19.6 
Slovakia -6.5 -4.0 -4.2 -5.2 -4.3 -4.9 -4.6 
Slovenia -1.3 -0.7 -0.9 1.2 -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 
Spain 10.2 16.1 6.9 43.5 5.7 16.5 15.7 
Sweden 6.6 4.5 3.3 7.2 3.1 4.9 4.7 
UK 25.4 9.2 19.1 -8.6 13.7 11.8 11.2 
* The share in total demand (if positive) or total supply (if negative), percent. 
Year Number 
Title/Author(s) 
ESRI Authors/Co-authors Italicised 
   
2008   
 255 The Economic Impact of Climate Change 
  Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 254 Measuring International Inequity Aversion 
  Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 253 Using a Census to Assess the Reliability of a 
National Household Survey for Migration Research: 
The Case of Ireland 
  Alan Barrett and Elish Kelly 
   
 252 Risk Aversion, Time Preference, and the Social 
Cost of Carbon  
  David Anthoff, Richard S.J. Tol and Gary W. Yohe 
   
 251 The Impact of a Carbon Tax on Economic Growth 
and Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Ireland 
  Thomas Conefrey, John D. Fitz Gerald, Laura 
Malaguzzi Valeri and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 250 The Distributional Implications of a Carbon Tax in 
Ireland 
  Tim Callan, Sean Lyons, Susan Scott, Richard S.J. 
Tol and Stefano Verde 
   
 249 Measuring Material Deprivation in the Enlarged EU 
  Christopher T. Whelan, Brian Nolan and Bertrand 
Maître 
   
 248 Marginal Abatement Costs on Carbon-Dioxide 
Emissions: A Meta-Analysis 
  Onno Kuik, Luke Brander and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 247 Incorporating GHG Emission Costs in the Economic 
Appraisal of Projects Supported by State 
Development Agencies 
  Richard S.J. Tol and Seán Lyons 
   
 246 A Carton Tax for Ireland 
  Richard S.J. Tol, Tim Callan, Thomas Conefrey, 
John D. Fitz Gerald, Seán Lyons, Laura Malaguzzi 
Valeri and Susan Scott 
   
 245 Non-cash Benefits and the Distribution  of 
Economic Welfare 
  Tim Callan and Claire Keane 
   
 29
  244 Scenarios of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from 
Aviation 
  Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 243 The Effect of the Euro on Export Patterns: 
Empirical Evidence from Industry Data 
  Gavin Murphy and Iulia Siedschlag  
   
 242 The Economic Returns to Field of Study and 
Competencies Among Higher Education Graduates 
in Ireland 
  Elish Kelly, Philip O’Connell and Emer Smyth 
   
 241 European Climate Policy and Aviation Emissions 
  Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 240 Aviation and the Environment in the Context of the 
EU-US Open Skies Agreement 
  Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 239 Yuppie Kvetch? Work-life Conflict and Social Class 
in Western Europe 
  Frances McGinnity and Emma Calvert 
   
 238 Immigrants and Welfare Programmes: Exploring 
the Interactions between Immigrant 
Characteristics, Immigrant Welfare Dependence 
and Welfare Policy 
  Alan Barrett and Yvonne McCarthy 
   
 237 How Local is Hospital Treatment? An Exploratory 
Analysis of Public/Private Variation in Location of 
Treatment in Irish Acute Public Hospitals  
  Jacqueline O’Reilly and Miriam M. Wiley 
   
 236 The Immigrant Earnings Disadvantage Across the 
Earnings and Skills Distributions: The Case of 
Immigrants from the EU’s New Member States in 
Ireland 
  Alan Barrett, Seamus McGuinness and Martin 
O’Brien 
   
 235 Europeanisation of Inequality and European 
Reference Groups 
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